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Abstract : In England, Local Authorities (LAs) contribute to the care home
fees of two-thirds of care home residents aged 651 who pass a means test.
LAs typically pay fees below those faced by residents excluded from state
support. Most proposals for reform of the means test would increase the
proportion of residents entitled to state support. If care homes receive the LA
fee for more residents, they might increase fees for any remaining self-funders.
Alternatively, the LA fee might have to rise. We use two linked simulation
models to examine how alternative assumptions on post-reform fees affect
projected public costs and financial gains to residents of three potential
reforms to the means test. Raising the LA fee rate to maintain income per
resident would increase the projected public cost of the reforms by between
22% and 72% in the base year. It would reduce the average gain to care home
residents by between 8% and 12%. Raising post-reform fees for remaining
self-funders or requiring pre-reform self-funders to meet the difference between
the LA and self-funder fees, reduces the gains to residents by 28–37%. For
one reform, residents in the highest income quintile would face losses if the
self-funder fee rises.
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1. Introduction
The funding of long-term care continues to be the subject of debate in England as in
many countries with ageing populations (Colombo et al., 2011). The long-term care
system in England, has been characterised as a ‘safety-net’ (Ferna´ndez et al., 2009) or
‘residual’ (Brodsky et al., 2003) care system, supporting only those with very severe
needs who, on the basis of a strict income and assets test, are judged unable to meet
the costs of their care. There has been consensus on the need to reform the system for
some time but less agreement on the detailed workings of any new system.
In 2006–2007, there were around 325 thousand people aged 65 and over
living in care homes in England (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010). The National
Health Service (NHS) pays care home fees in full for an estimated 29 thousand
of them who are assessed as having a need that is primarily for health care.
Others must apply to a Local Authority (LA) and undergo a means test, as well
as a needs assessment, to obtain any contribution from an LA towards the costs
of living in a care home. About a third of those not eligible for NHS fully funded
care are estimated to have resources that disqualify them from LA support. They
are known as ‘self-funders’. The other two-thirds receive a contribution to the
costs of their care from their LA (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010).
In April 2010, 93% of care homes in England were in the independent sector
(Care Quality Commission, 2010). LAs purchase care home places from these
providers on behalf of residents to whom they provide financial support. In 2005,
the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) noted:
ypeople have told us that the fees paid by Authorities to care homes for older people do
not cover the full costs to the care home of providing care, plus a reasonable profit margin.
(OFT, 2005, paragraph 1.50)
The report identified possible consequences of this as being that care homes
may be forced out of the market leading to a shortfall in capacity and/or that
care homes may charge higher fees to self-funders who thus cross-subsidise
publicly funded residents. In a 2000–2001 study of care home closures, 72% of
responding inspection unit managers cited LA pricing policies as a factor in
home closures (Netten et al., 2005). More recent evidence indicates that the fee
differential persists:
Self-pay fees are still typically £50–£100 higher than local authority fees on a similar
service and similar amenity basis, though premiums may be lower in areas of acute
capacity shortage where local authorities have been forced to match self pay rates.
(Laing and Buisson, 2011: 203)
A recent report for the OFT concluded that
The residential care homes market is a ‘buyers’ market y but [Local Authorities]
appear to lack a full understanding of the impact of their decisions on the market, with
a short term focus on pricey .
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011: 29)
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A major private sector provider of care homes has recently collapsed fol-
lowing financial difficulties and has referred to ‘‘downward pressure of average
weekly fee being paid by Local Authorities’’ as one contributory factor
(Southern Cross, 2011: 3). A survey of 238 social care providers carried out by
Community Care magazine at the beginning of 2011 revealed that two-thirds of
responding providers had had their fees cut (Community Care, 16 February
2011). The same source also reports that a number of councils are facing legal
challenges to their fee reductions, amid concerns that councils are abusing their
position as the biggest purchasers in their local area. At least one council has
been forced to raise their fees by a judicial review.
Most proposed reforms to the long-term care funding system would result
in more care home residents being eligible for some financial help from the
state (see Comas-Herrera et al. (2011) for a summary of proposals). Recently,
the independent Commission on Funding of Care and Support (CFCS) also
recommended a reform which would increase the proportion of residents
receiving LA funding (CFCS, 2011). Under all of these proposals, LAs could
therefore have more bargaining power in negotiating fees but there would be
fewer – and under some proposals no – self-funders to cross-subsidise publicly
funded residents. The fee levels negotiated by LAs could affect the public cost of
the reforms, the revenue, and hence profitability and supply, of care homes and
the fees that any remaining self-funders face. Yet there has been little discussion
of this issue in analysis of proposed reforms. Hancock and Hviid (2010)
demonstrate that under the current means test there are enough self-funders for
care homes to be able to recoup any losses on LA-funded residents via higher
fees for self-funders, but that reforms to the means test could change this. At a
time of tight budgets, LAs may respond to any reform which requires them
to meet a greater share of the costs of residential care, by seeking larger fee
discounts, exacerbating the concerns identified by the OFT. The issue is relevant
beyond the United Kingdom. In the United States, the difference in fees paid by
residents supported through the means-tested Medicaid and by private payers or
those supported via the insurance-based Medicare programme has attracted
attention (Ettner, 1993; Cohen and Spector, 1996; Harrington Meyer, 2001;
Troyer, 2002; Grabowski, 2007; Millers et al., 2009).
The aim of this paper is to assess how alternative assumptions on the care
home fees paid by LA-supported and other care home residents change the
projected effects of possible reforms to the means tests. It is not our purpose to
argue that LAs should pay higher fees or that care homes should not cross-
subsidise from self-funders to LA-supported residents. We argue, however, that
under reforms which increase the proportion of residents who receive LA
funding, an assumption that there would be no change in the fees paid by LAs or
by any remaining self-funders is only one of several possible assumptions that
could be made in preparing projections of the effects of such reforms. The ability
of care homes to absorb the reduction in revenue implied by such an assumption
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is open to question. Machin and Wilson (2004) found that the main effect on the
care home sector of an increase in the UK minimum wage was an exit of
providers from the market suggesting that they do not have substantial scope to
accommodate increased costs or revenue reductions.
Using two linked simulation models, we consider the effects on public
spending on older people in care homes for a base year (2007) and for 20 years
from then. The numbers of older people needing care is expected to rise and the
balance between LA-supported and self-funders may change (Hancock et al.,
2007a; Wittenberg et al., 2008; King et al., 2010), so it is important to consider
not only the likely immediate effects of any reforms but also the effects in future
years. We also present estimates of how the costs met by care home residents
would be distributed by income level. Much of the debate on reform of long-
term care funding has focussed on the need for a fairer system (Keen and Bell,
2009). One reason why two members of the 1997 Royal Commission on Long-
Term Care dissented from its recommendation of ‘free personal care’ was that
they believed that the immediate beneficiaries would be relatively well-off older
people (Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, 1999). Previous analysis
showed that the benefits of reforms to the long-term care funding system can
vary considerably according to the income level of the care recipient but did not
consider the role of care home fees (Hancock et al., 2007b).
2. Financing long-term residential care in England: the current system
and some reform options
2.1 The current long-term residential care funding system in England
In England, access to public funds for long-term residential care is means-tested,
other than for the small proportion (about 6%) of care home residents for
whom the NHS meets the fees in full. For others who are assessed as needing
nursing care, the NHS makes a fixed non-means-tested contribution to that part
of the care home fee attributed to the cost of nursing care. LAs contribute to the
remainder of the care home’s fees based on a means test (Department of Health,
2010) which assesses a resident’s income, financial wealth and, after 12 weeks in a
care home, their housing wealth. In Scotland, care home residents also receive a
non-means-tested flat-rate contribution to the part of a care home fee attributed
to personal care; Scotland accepted the Royal Commission recommendation of
free personal care.
Many care home residents are entitled to one of two non-means-tested social
security benefits – Attendance Allowance (AA) and Disability Living Allowance
(DLA) – which are paid to people with care needs. AA, the care component of
DLA if received at one of the two higher rates and the related Severe Disability
Premium (SDP) paid with means-tested benefits, are included in assessable
income in determining a resident’s contribution to care home fees. However, if a
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resident receives LA support with a care home’s fees, payment of these benefits
ceases after four weeks. Further details of the means test are given in the
appendix. Few care home residents are liable for the full costs on the basis of
their incomes alone; self-funders are generally people with significant assets,
usually in the form of housing wealth (Mayhew et al., 2010).
2.2 Criticisms of the current system and reform options
The ability to insure against the risk of needing long-term care is likely to be
welfare enhancing (Barr, 2010) but the current English long-term care system
does not permit people to insure fully against the risk of needing to fund care in
later life. The market for private long-term care insurance is very small in the
United Kingdom (Comas-Herrera et al., 2011b). The public system provides
only partial insurance. The complex means test for public support makes it
difficult for individuals to judge whether it would benefit them to supplement
public support through private savings or insurance. The means test generates
100% effective marginal tax rates on income and the capital thresholds produce
discontinuities in the return to savings. The system may therefore distort savings
decisions (in general and as between saving in different forms). This has led to
concerns that the current system reduces incentives to save (Her Majesty’s
Government, 2009; Mayhew et al., 2010). The inclusion of housing wealth in
the means test for residential care but not care at home (Department of Health,
2003) gives LAs an incentive to fund residential rather than home care for
people with housing wealth when the gross cost of care in their own homes
is close to that of residential care. In such situations, LAs can recover more of
the cost if the care is provided in a care home. The corollary is that older people
with housing wealth face higher charges for care in a care home than for
equivalent cost care at home.
Most of the reform options that have been debated for residential care in
England involve the state making some non-means-tested contribution to the
personal care component of care home fees, moving closer to a system of social
insurance (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010). One option is to follow Scotland and
introduce a flat-rate non-means-tested state contribution to the personal care
component of care home fees. This is one interpretation of the ‘comprehensive’
option, as it would apply to residential care, that was stated as the then
Government’s long-term ambition in a 2010 White Paper (Her Majesty’s
Government, 2010). It is also one version of ‘free’ personal care recommended
in the majority report of the Royal Commission on Long-Term Care (1999). The
Wanless Review of Social Care (Wanless, 2006) and the 2009 Green Paper
(Her Majesty’s Government, 2009) both suggested a ‘partnership model’ in
which a proportion of care costs would be met by the state without a means test;
state help with the remainder of the costs would remain means-tested. The 2010
White Paper proposed an interim reform in which the state would meet the costs
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of personal care without a means test once a resident had been in a care home
for two years. Such a reform would provide a degree of protection for residents’
assets. By placing a maximum on the period for which residents’ would be
required to contribute to care home fees, it might also encourage a market for
insurance products to cover the more limited risk that individuals would face.
The central recommendation of the CFCS is similar to this but defines the limit
in terms of the total value of care received including home care (CFCS, 2011).
We analyse three potential reforms to the means tests for residential care,
which have their roots in the options discussed above (Table 1).
Under two reforms, the state would provide a fixed non-means-tested con-
tribution to the costs of personal care for all care home residents (reform 1, ‘free
personal care’) or for those who have been in a care home for more than two
years (reform 2, ‘limited liability’). Under these reforms, the contribution would
equal an amount deemed to be the component of care home fees attributable to
personal care costs.
Reform 3 (‘housing disregard’) exempts housing wealth from the means test
for the personal care component of care home fees although it would still be
taken into account in assessing a resident’s contribution to ‘hotel’ costs, that is,
that part of the fees attributable to accommodation, food etc. This reform
would reduce the incentive for LAs to fund residential rather than care at home
but would introduce a greater differential in the treatment of housing and non-
housing wealth. We assume that the assessment of the contribution towards the
personal care component of fees is made before the assessment for hotel costs.
The resident’s contribution to hotel costs would then be determined by any
income and non-housing wealth remaining after meeting their contribution
towards personal care and by their housing wealth after the first 12 weeks.
Reform 1 (free personal care) would result in all those assessed as having a
need for a care home place being entitled to a contribution from a LA. LAs could
thus negotiate fees for all care home residents who claimed this entitlement. The
other reforms would increase the proportion of care home residents entitled to a
contribution from the state but some residents would remain liable for the full
fees. For each of the reforms we test the sensitivity of the results to the fees paid
in respect of LA-supported residents after the reform. Initially, we assume that
fees are unchanged after the reform. An alternative is that the fees paid by LAs
rise after the reform to maintain care homes’ revenue per resident at the current
estimated levels. A second alternative is that residents who would be self-funders
under the current system, pay the self-funder fee rate after the reform, apart
from the flat-rate non-means-tested state contribution. This happened when free
personal care was introduced in Scotland. It is likely to be practicable only
where the state contribution to care costs is not means-tested so we consider it
only for reforms 1 and 2. For reforms 2 and 3, where there would remain
residents who are wholly self-funded, we examine the possibility that it is the
self-funder fee rate rather than the LA fee rate that rises.
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Table 1. Summary of reforms examined
Reform Change from current means test Rationale Fee options examined following reform
(1) Free personal
care
A non-means-tested flat-rate state
contribution covering the assumed cost
of personal care
Version of reform recommended by the
Royal Commission on Long-Term Care
(1999); an interpretation of the
‘comprehensive option’ in the 2010 White
Paper (Her Majesty’s Government, 2010)
(1) Pre-reform LA fee applies to all
(2) LA fee is increased and applies to all
(3) No change in fees but pre-reform
self-funders continue to pay self-
funder fee
(2) Limited liability The state meets the assumed personal
care cost element of care home fees after
two years in a care home
Suggested as an interim measure in
2010 White Paper. Similar to the
recommendation of the CFCS (CFCS, 2011)
(1) Pre-reform LA fee applies to LA
supported, no change in self-funder
fee
(2) LA fee is increased
(3) No change in fees but pre-reform
self-funders continue to pay
self-funder fee
(4) No change in LA fee, self-funder
fee increased
(3) Housing
disregard
Housing wealth is disregarded for the
personal care element of care home fees,
resident’s contribution to care costs
from income is assessed before assessing
their contribution to hotel costs, which
are assessed against the remainder of
their income and their capital, as under
the current means test
Addresses concern over requirement to use
housing wealth to pay for care; removes
incentive for LAs to arrange residential care
rather than care at home. Costs to state are
minimised by assessing contribution to care
costs before assessing contribution to hotel
costs
(1) Pre-reform LA fee applies to LA
supported, no change in self-funder fee
(2) LA fee is increased
(3) No change in LA fee, self-funder fee
increased
LA5Local Authority; CFCS5Commission on Funding Care and Support.
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For all reforms, we assume that payments of AA, DLA and the SDP would
cease for residents in receipt of any LA support. This happens under the current
English system and under free personal care in Scotland.
To examine the effect of these reforms, care home fees must be decomposed
into nursing care costs, personal care costs and hotel costs. Assumed levels of
fees and their decomposition are shown in Appendix Table A2. The amount of
the fee that is deemed to be care rather than hotel costs is assumed to be the
same for all types of care homes places. Hotel costs are then the difference
between the assumed total fee (less any state contribution to nursing care) and
this amount, and vary across types of care home places. For independent sector
homes, we assume that under the current funding system, self-funders pay
higher fees than LA-supported residents. In LA homes, the fees are assumed
throughout to be the same for LA-supported and self-funding residents.
An important issue for the effects of the reforms in future years is how any
non-means-tested state contribution is determined over time. The projected
future cost of reforms can appear more affordable if it is assumed that the non-
means-tested state contribution (or in the case of reform 3, the part of the fee for
which housing wealth is disregarded) grows by less than any growth in care
home fees (Hancock et al., 2010). Although the future costs of reforms would be
contained by such a policy, benefits to care home residents compared with the
current funding regime would fall over time. Here we assume that total care
home fees grow by a little less than real earnings growth (staff and capital costs,
which form the majority of care home costs, are assumed to rise at the rate of
real earnings growth; other costs are assumed to rise at the rate of general price
inflation). We assume that the amount of the fee that is deemed to be care rather
than hotel costs is uprated over time by real earnings growth. This matches our
assumption that the NHS contribution to the nursing care component of fees for
nursing home places is linked to earnings, which has been past practice. The
proportion of fees accounted for by care costs and hence exempted fully (reform 1)
or partially (reform 2) from the means test or not tested against housing wealth
(reform 3) changes only marginally over time.
3. Methods
The two simulation models that we use are the Personal Social Services Research
Unit (PSSRU) Long-term Care model and CARESIM, a microsimulation model
of care charges.
3.1 The PSSRU long-term care model
The PSSRU model is concerned mainly with the aggregate effects of long-term
care policies. It makes projections of private and public expenditure on long-
term care in absolute terms and as a per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
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volumes of services provided and public expenditure on disability benefits. Here
we are concerned with residential care, which includes care in homes that
provide nursing care and/or personal care.
3.2 CARESIM
CARESIM is a microsimulation model that uses a pooled sample of 25,747
people aged 651 living in England from the 2002–2003, 2003–2004 and
2004–2005 UK Family Resources Survey (FRS; Department for Work and
Pensions, 2010). Information on sample members’ incomes, assets (including
estimates we make of their housing wealth) and other relevant characteristics
are used to simulate their liability to pay for care, should care be needed, under
the current and alternative means tests. The simulations are performed for a
base year and for future years. Monte Carlo techniques are used to ‘age’ the
sample and to assign uncompleted lengths of stay in a care home to sample
members. Liability to contribute to care home fees is calculated allowing for
asset depletion to have taken place during the assigned time in a care home. In
effect for each projection year, this mimics the observation of a cross-section of
care home residents, producing results that can be used with the PSSRU model.
Both models produce outputs that relate to a point in time.
Because it is more difficult to predict the future incomes of people who are not
yet retired than it is for those who are already drawing pensions, the sample is
not refreshed. By 20 years from the base year, the simulations are representative
only of people aged 85 and over. The distributional analysis shown below is
therefore confined to people aged 85 and over. It is amongst this oldest age
group that the proportion of people living in care homes is highest.
3.3 Links between the two models
Within CARESIM, simulations are performed for three types of care home
place: places with nursing care in independent sector homes, which provide both
nursing and personal care; places without nursing care in independent sector
homes, which provide only personal care (independent residential care places);
and LA-run homes, which provide personal but not nursing care.
The PSSRU projections on the numbers and characteristics of people in each
type of care home place provide weights with which to adjust the CARESIM
sample to be representative of people in care homes. A proportion of indepen-
dent sector nursing care places are assumed to be fully funded by the NHS. For
other types of places, CARESIM provides output to the PSSRU model, which is
used to apportion total expenditure into private and public expenditure under
the current and alternative means tests.
Results from the models provide point-in-time estimates of public and private
expenditure on care and of changes in care home residents’ disposable incomes.
Further model details are in the Appendix.
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In this paper, there is no direct allowance for demand for or supply of care
homes to respond to changes in the funding system. Projections assume that
demand for care home places grows as a result of population ageing and
assumed trends in other needs-related characteristics and the supply of care
homes adjusts such that demand is no more constrained by supply than in the
base year.
3.4 Key assumptions
All the analysis in this paper relates to England. The key economic and demo-
graphic assumptions used for a ‘base case’ are set out in Box A1 in the appendix.
Projections for this base case are compared with projections under alternative
funding regimes and alternative assumptions on fee levels. All money values are
expressed in 2007 prices. Public expenditure on long-term residential care for
older people includes disability benefits received by self-funders and used
towards the cost of their care as well as LA spending on care home fees.
3.5 Measuring the distributional effects of potential reforms
To assess the distributional effects of funding regimes we analyse the simulated
financial gains to care home residents according to their position in the income
distribution specific to their age group – here those aged 85 and over. We classify
residents by their position in the income distribution specific to their age group,
rather than by their position in the income distribution for the whole population
because we are examining reforms that affect mainly people in the older age
group. Our analysis thus assesses the extent to which among the age group
affected, gains would be concentrated on those with relatively high or low
incomes for that age group. Our approach also ensures that sample sizes are
equal in each income quintile. Income is the net income of the family unit (single
older person or older couple) that would be received by the unit when living at
home without any care needs. AA/DLA, and associated additions to means-
tested benefits are not included. To include them without any allowance for the
costs of disability that they are designed to address, would overstate recipients’
living standards (Stapleton et al., 2008; Hancock and Pudney 2010). Net income
for this purpose includes investment income but does not take account of
housing wealth. It is adjusted for composition of the family unit using the
OECD modified equivalence scale (Hagenaars et al., 1994) of 1 for the first
adult, 0.5 for each subsequent adult or child aged at least 14 years and 0.3 for
each younger child. Amongst the 851 age group the thresholds for the income
quintiles are £6400, £7200, £8000 and £10,400 (annual income in 2007 prices).
Corresponding thresholds for the total population are £5700, £9200, £13,400
and £20,100. Incomes of the 851 population are much lower than for the
total population; for example, the threshold for the top quintile for the 851
population is roughly half that for the total population.
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Gains from the reforms are measured as the change in disposable income,
net of contribution to care home fees. AA/DLA and associated additions to
means-tested benefits are included in disposable income for this purpose,
because the reforms may change irrespective of such income is received. Since
some of the benefit of the reform derives from a slower depletion of capital,
disposable income includes an assumed 2% real return on any capital that is left
at the point that we ‘observe’ residents.
4. Results
4.1 The consequences of differential fees under present funding policy
Under our base case, public expenditure in England on long-term residential care
for people aged 651 and associated disability benefits is estimated to be £5.5bn in
2007, or 0.45% of GDP. If the fee differential were removed such that fees paid in
respect of LA-supported and self-funding residents are equal to the weighted
average of those assumed under the base case, the public cost of long-term
residential care for older people would need to be about 4% higher to meet the
extra cost to LAs. If public spending remained at base case levels, the implication is
that there would be some 13,000 fewer care home places attracting public funding.
If public funding were expanded to meet this extra cost, we estimate that the
distribution of gains across income groups, in terms of reduced costs to residents
(before taking account of how this expansion would be financed), would be as
shown in Figure 1. The main beneficiaries would be current self-funders. This is
because under the current means test, the contribution that LA-funded residents pay
towards care home fees is insensitive to the level of the care home fees, being
determined largely by their income, rather than by the fee itself. In contrast, self-
funders pay higher fees as a consequence of LAs negotiating below market fees, and
so benefit if this differential is removed. There are more self-funders in the higher
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Figure 1. Average gains from removing the difference between the self-funder and Local
Authority fee rates; care home residents aged 651, 2007
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income groups. Average gains from removing the fee differential are highest in the
top quintile at £28 per week and lowest in the bottom quintile at £9. That average
gains are positive in all quintiles shows that self-funders are spread around the
income distribution, largely because self-funding status depends more on wealth,
and in particular housing wealth, than income. Thus, there are income-poor,
housing-rich individuals who would benefit from removal of the fee differential.
Our projections suggest that by 2027, public expenditure on long-term resi-
dential care for people aged 651 would double to £11 bn (April 2007 prices)
under the current funding system, assuming the present differences in LA and
self-funder fees remain. This would amount to around 0.66% of GDP. Removal
of the fee differentials would add a little under £0.5 bn to public spending in
2027, taking it to 0.68% of GDP.
4.2 Effects of reforms
Figures 2–4 show the extra public expenditure costs of the reforms in the base
year and after 20 years. Free personal care would increase public spending the
most, adding around £0.9 bn in 2007, rising to £2.8 bn by 2027, bringing
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Figure 3. Projected additional public expenditure on care home places, 2007–2027 under
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expenditure to 0.82% of GDP at that point. If LAs were to increase the fees they
pay on behalf of residents to a level which maintains care homes’ revenue per
place, this would add a further £0.2 bn in 2007 rising to £0.4 bn by 2027 at
which point public spending would amount to 0.85% of GDP. The housing
disregard reform costs less than the limited liability reform, although the public
cost of both increases noticeably if LA fee levels rise. The public cost of the
housing disregard reform is projected to be £0.25 bn in 2007 if LA fees are
unchanged (bringing the total public cost to 0.47% of GDP) and £0.43 bn (total
cost 0.49% of GDP) if they are increased. Corresponding figures for 2027 are
£0.75 bn (total cost 0.70% of GDP) with no fee change and £1.11 bn (total cost
0.72% of GDP) if LA fees rise. Equivalent costs for the limited liability reform
are £0.41 bn (total cost 0.49% of GDP) compared with £0.55 bn (total cost
0.50% of GDP) in 2007 and £1.42 bn (total cost 0.74% of GDP) compared with
£1.66 bn (total cost 0.75% of GDP) in 2027.
If the self-funder fee is assumed to rise (reforms 2 and 3) or if those who
would otherwise be self-funders continue to pay the self-funder rate (reforms 1
and 2) public expenditure is affected only in so far as residents liable for the
higher self-funder fee deplete their assets faster and may become eligible for state
support sooner. Our results suggest this effect is marginal. These variants are
therefore not included in the graphs.
Table 2 presents the simulated mean weekly gains from each of the reforms
for care home residents aged 651 in 2007. Figures in the first column show that
without any fee adjustment, mean weekly gains are projected to be around £94
for free personal care, £45 for limited liability and £40 for the housing dis-
regard. The gains attributable to higher public spending shown in column two,
are £66, £31 and £22. The differences between these two sets of figures are
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Figure 4. Projected additional public expenditure on care home places, 2007–2027, under
housing disregard
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attributable mostly to the gains to residents resulting from a switch from the
self-funder fee rate to the LA fee rate. They are thus indicative of the reduction
in care home income per resident that the reforms would produce if care homes
received the LA fee for all residents receiving some LA support. Thus under free
personal care, care home providers would receive about £29 less on average per
resident. The reduction is least, at around £14, for the limited liability option.
These amounts can be compared with the average total fee over all types of care
home places that we simulate to be received by care homes. In 2007, this average
was £542. So the loss in income under the reforms if fees are not adjusted ranges
from 2.6% to about 5.3% per resident.
Subsequent columns in Table 2 show that the gains to residents would be less
if the LA or the self-funder fee were to rise or those who self-fund under the
current system continue to be liable for the self-funder rate even if they receive
LA support. The mean gains are all lower. The differences are largest if those
who self-fund under the current financing system remain liable for the self-
funder rate. Under limited liability, for example, this would reduce the mean
gain from £45.10 to £32.50 (28%). The differences are smallest if the LA fee is
increased but even here gains are lower by between 8% (limited liability) and
12% (housing disregard).
The effects of the reforms and of the alternative assumptions on fee rates vary
according to the residents’ income levels (Figures 5–10). Gains from free personal
care increase steadily with income level, favouring most those in the highest
income quintile. Without any fee adjustment, mean weekly gains in 2007 from
free personal care range from £73 in the lowest income group to £175 in the
highest group. Increased fee levels or maintaining self-funders on the self-funder
fee rate reduces the gains most in the higher income quintiles but the association
between size of gain and income level remains. The limited liability reform also
benefits the highest income quintile most but there is less variation across the
other income quintiles, at least in 2007.
Table 2. Simulated average weekly gains from reforms, care home residents aged 651, 2007
Without fee adjustment
With LA fee
adjustment
With SF fee
adjustment
Self-funders
continue to SF fee
Reform Total gain
Gain attributable
to higher public
expenditure Total gain Total gain Total gain
£s per week
(1) Free personal care 94.10 65.60 84.10 – 68.10
(2) Limited liability 45.10 31.20 42.30 33.30 32.50
(3) Housing disregard 40.50 21.90 35.50 25.60 –
LA5Local Authority; SF5 self-fund.
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In contrast to reforms 1 and 2, the housing disregard reform benefits those in
the highest income group the least. Residents in this income group are likely
to be able (and would be required) to meet their care home fees in full from
their income. This is a reform that favours those who are housing-rich but
income-poor. Indeed, if the self-funder fee rate rises to compensate for the
increased proportion of residents paying the LA rate, residents in the top income
quintile would lose an average of £66 per week from this reform in 2007.
Expressed in 2007 prices, all the gains are larger in 2027 than in 2007 but the
pattern across income quintiles of the different reforms and fee assumptions is
similar.
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5. Discussion
In this paper, we have used two simulation models to examine the costs and
distributional effects of potential reforms to the English system of funding long-
term residential care for older people. We have paid attention to the differentials
between the fee rates paid in respect of LA-supported residents and those paid
by self-funders. The current differentials imply the existence of cross-subsidies
from self-funders to LA-supported residents. The price differential could be
viewed as a form of price discrimination which can be welfare enhancing, but
the care home market does not appear to meet the conditions for this to be the
case (Hancock and Hviid, 2010).
In common with funding reforms proposed in recent years, all the reforms
examined here would increase the proportion of residents receiving some LA
support. If care homes were to receive the lower LA fee rate for all such
residents, their income per resident would fall. The supply of care home places
could reduce as a result. We therefore examined three ways in which care home
income per resident might be maintained after implementation of the reforms.
One option is for the fee paid by LAs to rise. A second is for those who would be
self-funders under the current system to continue to be liable for the self-funder
fee. This is likely to be practicable only for reforms in which there is a non-
means-tested state contribution. The third option is for the self-funder fee rate
to rise. This last option is clearly possible only for reforms where there remain
some self-funders.
We found that raising the LA fee rate would raise the public cost of the reforms
by over £200m for free personal care in 2007, and more than double that by
2027. For this reform it would reduce the average gain to care home residents
by about £10 a week in 2007. Raising the self-funder rate has little effect on the
91 84 92 90
34
83 75 80 77
28
90 82 91 81
-86-90
-50
-10
30
70
110
150
190
230
270
310
350
Age-group specific income quintile
(excluding disability-related income)
£s
 p
w,
 2
00
7 
pr
ice
s
Housing dis. for care
Housing dis. for care + LA fee rise
Housing dis. for care + SF fee rise
Q1
(lowest)
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
(highest)
Figure 10. Mean gains by income quintile, housing disregard for care reforms, care home
residents aged 851, 2027
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public cost. Requiring residents who would self-fund under the current system to
pay the self-funder rate under reforms where they would be eligible for a non-
means-tested state contribution reduces the 2007 gains to care home residents by
£13 (limited liability) and £26 (free personal care) on average. If fee rates remain
at their projected levels under the current system, the reforms would reduce the
income per resident received by care homes by between £14 and £29 a week or
2.6% to 5.3% of their current average fee per resident.
The precise details of how a reformed system would operate in practice are
important to its effects. In the reforms examined here, a key assumption was that
the split of care home fees into costs associated with nursing care, personal care
and hotel costs remains broadly constant over time. Within the current funding
system there is already a non-means-tested contribution to nursing care. The
reforms examined would introduce a non-means-tested contribution to personal
care or exempt housing wealth from the means test for help with the personal
care component of fees. Under the current system, a fall in the value of the
non-means-tested contribution to nursing care relative to the total fee, would
result in more of the fee being subject to the means test. Similarly, in the reforms
examined, if the personal care component does not keep pace with growth in fees,
the costs and benefits to residents of the reforms would decline over time. The
method of uprating any component of fees that is treated more favourably in the
means test is a political choice but one whose effects need to be understood. When
Scotland introduced a non-means-tested state contribution to the care component
of care home fees in 2002, that contribution remained constant in nominal terms
for several years before being increased in 2008 (Scottish Government, 2009).
A similar thing happened in Germany (Rothgang, 2002).
For the reform in which housing wealth is disregarded in assessing a resident’s
contribution to the care component of care home fees we assumed that this
assessment is made before assessing their contribution to hotel costs. This is
important since only income and non-housing wealth would be assessed for a
resident’s contribution to personal care. If residents are allowed to use their
income and non-housing wealth towards hotel costs before their contribution to
these care costs is assessed, that contribution will be smaller and the cost to
public funds will be larger. Moreover, only those whose income and non-housing
wealth is sufficient to cover the full costs of the fees would be self-funders.
A strength of this paper is the use of two linked simulation models. This allows
us to model the complex English long-term care funding system and its interac-
tions with the income tax and benefit system for older people, and investigate the
likely aggregate and distributional effects of a wide range of potential reforms to
the system. However, any modelling exercise such as this relies on a great many
assumptions about factors that are treated as exogenous to the reforms examined,
and how demand and supply might respond to reforms. The sensitivity of pro-
jections of long-term care expenditure to alternative assumptions on the numbers
of disabled older people and trends in unit costs of care has been investigated
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elsewhere (Hancock et al., 2003; Wittenberg et al., 2008; Malley et al., 2011). We
do not here allow explicitly for potential changes in the supply and demand for
care home places as a result of the reforms. Nonetheless, a concern that potential
reforms to the funding system could reduce care home revenues and hence the
supply of places is at the heart of this paper. We have sought to illustrate how
adjustments to care home fees that could prevent this fall in revenues would affect
the cost and distributional consequences of such reforms.
We have had to make a number of assumptions based on imperfect data. One
area is length of time care home residents spend in care homes. Assumptions on
such durations are important for determining the extent to which residents have
depleted their capital by the point at which we calculate their assessed con-
tribution to a care home’s fees and under reform 3, which of them have been in a
care home for at least two years. The data and method used follows that
described in Wittenberg et al. (2002). In our base year, it produces a mean and
median uncompleted length of stay of 2.7 and 2.1 years, respectively. This is
higher than the mean and median completed duration of 2.2 and 1.3 years found
using more recent data (Forder and Fernandez, 2011). A sample of the stock of
care homes spells in process may contain more long spells and fewer short spells
than a sample of completed spells. Nonetheless, our data on uncompleted spells
are somewhat out of date and durations in care homes may have fallen since
then (Forder and Fernandez, 2011). If that has happened we will have over-
estimated the effects of reforms that change the rate at which residents deplete
their capital and overestimated the costs of the limited liability reform.
For the distributional analysis, we have classified care home residents according
to their position in the income distribution for their age group. This ensures a
reasonable sample size in each income quintile and, given that the sample is not
refreshed, allows us to draw comparisons at least for the 851 age group between the
base year and 20 years hence. However, it needs to be remembered that in the
analysis people aged 851 in the top income quintile have high incomes for their age
group. In our sample, in 2007, only 20% of the 851 age group who were in the top
income quintile for their age group, had incomes in the top quintile for the total
adult population. For the 651 population as a whole, 35% of those in the top
quintile for their age group were in the highest income quintile for the total popu-
lation. Our analysis addresses vertical but not horizontal equity concerns. Much of
the debate on long-term care funding has been concerned with so-called ‘diagnostic
inequities’. The NHS seeks to provide health care on the basis of health need alone
rather than ability to pay. Access to publicly funded long-term personal care takes
account of both care needs and ability to pay. People suffering from some illnesses
receive personal care without charge as a by-product of NHS care, whereas
those whose care needs stem from conditions for which treatments are not available
on the NHS are required to contribute. Nevertheless, it seems important than
any reforms to the system are made with knowledge of their effects on different
income groups.
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Finally, no account is taken of how the reforms would be financed. All involve
higher public expenditure. This could be financed by cuts in spending elsewhere,
borrowing or raising extra public revenue. There are very many ways to raise
extra revenue, each with the potential to affect different population groups
differently. Our assessment of the distributional effects of potential reforms to
the long-term care funding system thus needs to be complemented by an
assessment of the distributional effects of any proposals to raise revenue to
finance them.
6. Conclusion
In England, it is commonly believed that LAs currently pay care home fee rates that
are below the level at which care homes break even. If this is the case, the supply of
care homes is dependent on care homes being able to charge self-funders higher
rates. A policy reform that substantially increases the proportion of residents on the
lower LA fee may not be sustainable unless the LA fee rate is increased. If that
happens, the cost to the public sector will be higher and the gains to care home
residents will be lower. Alternatives to increasing the LA fee rate are either an
increase in the self-funder rate or retaining the self-funder rate for those who would
be self-funders under the present funding regime. Although these have relatively
small effects on the public finances, they can considerably reduce the benefits to
residents that result from the reform. Indeed, they can result in losses for some
residents. It would be unwise to ignore this issue when considering proposals to
reform the English long-term care financing system or other systems in which there
may be cross-subsidisation between publicly and privately funded recipients of care.
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Appendix
The means test for state help with care home fees
Residents with capital above an upper threshold are not entitled to Local
Authority (LA) support. Housing wealth is included in capital, after the first
12 weeks in a care home, unless a qualifying relative continues to live in the
resident’s home. For residents with capital below the upper limit, LAs meet any
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positive difference between the care home fee and their income after deducting a
personal expenses allowance (PEA) and a disregard on income from savings.
Income from capital is not included in assessed income, but capital above the
lower threshold is deemed to generate a return that is included to assessed
income.
Decomposing care home fees into nursing care, personal care and
hotel costs
Assumptions on the average LA fee rate charged in each kind of home in April
2007 are based on Department of Health administrative data (PSS EX1) on fees
paid by LAs in 2006–2007, uprated to 2007 prices using the Retail Price Index
(RPI). Self-funder fee rates are assumed to be about £80 a week higher than this,
based on various Laing and Buisson surveys of the care home market. An
estimate of personal care costs for LA-supported residents in independent sector
residential care is derived as follows. We take the minimum income guaranteed
for a single pensioner through the means-tested benefit system in April 2007,
plus an allowance for accommodation costs as being the hotel cost component
of the assumed fee for a residential care place in an independent sector home.
The allowance for accommodation is based on the residential allowance which
existed until 2003 for older people in care homes who were claiming means-
tested benefits, increased by the RPI to April 2007 prices. Personal care costs are
then derived as the difference between the fee rate for LA-supported residential
care places in independent homes and these hotel costs and assumed to be the
same for all types of care home places. The nursing care costs of nursing
care places are assumed to be the level met by the National Health Service.
Hotel costs are then assumed to be the difference between the fee level and the
assumed personal care and (where relevant) nursing care costs.
Table A1. Values of main parameters of the care home means test, April 2007
Non-means-tested NHS contribution to nursing care £95
Upper capital threshold £21,500
Lower capital threshold £13,000
Assumed income from capital above the lower threshold (£s per week) 1/250
Personal Expenses Allowance per week £20.45
Savings disregard (single person) per week £5.25
Savings disregard per week (couple) £7.85
AA/DLA per week (high rate) £64.50
AA per week (low rate)/DLA (middle rate) £43.15
SDP in means-tested benefits £48.45
NHS5National Health Service; AA5Attendance Allowance; DLA5Disability Living Allowance;
SDP5 Severe Disability Premium.
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Table A2. Assumed components of care home fees, £s per week, April 2007 prices
LA residential
Independent residential care Independent nursing care
care LA-supported Self-funder LA-supported Self-funder
2007
Personal care, all regimes 248.70 248.70 248.70 248.70 248.70
Nursing care, all regimes 95.00 95.00
Current funding regime and
reforms without fee adjustment
Hotel costs 628.30 170.30 250.30 228.30 307.30
Total fee 877.00a 419.00a 499.00a 572.00ab 651.00ab
Reforms 1 LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 628.30 197.30 na 259.30 na
Total fee 877.00a 446.00a na 603.00ab na
Reform 2, LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 628.30 186.30 250.30 247.30 307.30
Total cost 877.00a 435.00a 499.00a 591.00ab 651.00ab
Reform 2, SF fee adjusted
Hotel costs 628.30 170.30 327.30 228.30 384.30
Total cost 877.00a 419.00a 576.00a 572.00ab 728.00 ab
Reform 3 LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 628.30 192.30 250.30 252.30 307.30
Total fees 877.00a 441.00a 499.00a 596.00ab 651.00ab
Reform 3, SF fee adjusted
Hotel costs 628.30 170.30 440.30 228.30 488.30
Total cost 877.00a 419.00a 689.00a 572.00ab 832.00ab
2027
Personal care, all regimes 369.55 369.55 369.55 369.55 369.55
Nursing care, all regimes 142 142
Current funding system, reforms
1–4, without fee adjustment
Hotel costs 898.45 218.45 336.45 302.45 420.45
Total fee 1268.00a 588.00 a 706.00a 814.00ab 932.00ab
Reform 1, LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 898.45 258.45 na 348.45 na
Total fee 1268.00a 628.00a na 860.00ab na
Reform 2 LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 898.45 238.45 336.45 327.45 420.45
Total fee 1268.00a 608.00a 706.00a 839.00ab 932.00ab
Reform 2, SF fee adjusted
Hotel costs 898.45 218.45 421.45 302.45 504.45
Total fee 1268.00a 588.00a 791.00a 814.00ab 1016.00ab
Reform 3, LA fee adjusted
Hotel costs 898.45 248.45 336.45 337.45 420.45
Total cost 1268.00a 618.00a 706.00a 849.00ab 932.00ab
Reform 3, SF fee adjusted
Hotel cost 898.45 218.45 597.45 302.45 666.45
Total fee 1268.00a 588.00a 967.00a 814.00ab 1178.00ab
LA5Local Authority.; SF5 self-fund.
aIncludes personal care costs at £248.70 (2007) or £369.55 (2027: £248.7012% p.a.).
b Includes nursing care costs at £95 (2007) or £142 (2027:£9512% p.a.).
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Further details of the simulation models
For the base year, the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU) model
uses data on care home residents from the 2001 Census on their age, gender and
marital status of care home residents and from PSSRU sample surveys on their
previous household composition and housing tenure. It makes projections for
Box A1. Key economic and demographic assumptions used in the base case
> The number of people by age and gender changes in line with the GAD
(Government Actuary’s Department) 2006-based principal population
projections for England. Marital status changes in line with GAD 2006-
based marital status and cohabitation projections for England and Wales.
> Prevalence rates of disability by age and gender remain unchanged, as
reported in the 2001–2002 GHS (General Household Survey) for Great
Britain for household population (and assuming that all those in care
homes are disabled).
> Home-ownership rates, as reported in the pooled 2003–2004, 2004–2005
and 2005–2006 Family Resources Survey, change in line with projections
produced by CARESIM.
> The proportions of older people receiving care in a care home and
disability benefits remain constant by age, disability and other needs-
related characteristics.
> The staff and capital cost components of care home fees rise by 2% per
year in real terms. Non-staff revenue costs remain constant in real terms.
Average earnings increase by 2% per year in real terms. Real GDP rises in
line with 2008 Her Majesty’s Treasury assumptions.1
> The supply of care home places will adjust to match demand and demand
will be no more constrained by supply in the future than in the base year.
> State pensions and means-tested benefits for pensioners follow policy as it
was before recent Coalition Government changes which are currently going
through Parliament: the Basic State Pension is uprated in line with earnings
from 2012; the Guarantee Credit level in Pension Credit, Housing and
Council Tax Benefit is linked to earnings growth; the savings credit
threshold within Pension Credit is linked to earnings until 2014 after which
it is linked to price inflation as measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI).
> Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance are linked to the RPI.
> The long-term care funding system is the current system that operates in
England. The non-means-tested National Health Service contribution to
nursing care in a care home us uprated according to real earnings growth
> The differences in fees paid by Local Authority-supported and self-funding
residents in independent sector care homes are as given in Table A2for the
current funding regime.
1Short-term GDP and cash deflators based on 30 November 2008 estimates. Long-term
GDP projections are based on 2008 budget report (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2008).
72 R U T H H A N C O C K E T A L .
the future year based on specified assumptions about the evolution of future
trends in the socio-demographic and economic drivers of demand for and
expenditure on long-term care (see Box A1). Details can be found in Wittenberg
et al. (2006).
In CARESIM, death of sample members is simulated according to official
age and gender-specific mortality rates, using Monte Carlo techniques. The
evolution of gross incomes and capital is modelled under certain assumptions
and taking account of the inheritance of pension rights and assets when a
partner is simulated to die. Each older sample member is randomly allocated
an uncompleted duration (in weeks) in each of three types of care home
place using data from Netten et al. (1998; see also Wittenberg et al., 2002,
Appendix 3.1).
Underlying entitlements to Attendance Allowance (AA)/Disability Living
Allowance (DLA) are assigned for each type of care home place using prob-
abilities based on a 1999 survey of self-funded admissions to care homes (Netten
et al., 2001). Income tax liability and entitlement to means-tested social security
benefits are then simulated to arrive at net income on which liability to pay for
care home fees is assessed. In determining residents’ contributions to their care
home fees, we assume that they first allocate income apart from the PEA, to
these costs and draw on capital (financial assets followed by housing wealth)
only if income is insufficient. We assume that capital is not used for purposes
other than the resident’s contribution to care home fees. Self-funders in receipt
of AA or DLA are assumed to use that income before other income.
CARESIM provides age-group-specific estimates to the PSSRU model of: the
proportion of residents who self-fund; the proportion of the fees of self-funders
met from AA/DLA; and the proportion of fees contributed by LA-supported
residents from their assessed income and assets. For each projection year up to
2020, a weighted average across the three oldest age groups (75–79, 80–84,
851) of the proportion of care recipients entitled to LA support is derived using
as weights the proportions of care recipients that the PSSRU model projects
would be accounted for by each age group. For 2027, data for the oldest age
group are used. The trend over time in the resulting average is then applied to
the base year proportion entitled to LA funding assumed in the PSSRU model.
Weighted averages for the shares of costs met by LA-supported residents are
derived in a similar manner.
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